The First Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo (hereinafter: First Report) is one of the outputs of the project „Monitoring and Reporting on Internal Dialogue on Kosovo“ of the Forum for Ethnic Relations, supported by the Open Society Foundation. The report covers the period from 24 July to 31 October 2017.
In this period, judging by its scope, dynamic and achievements, the internal dialogue was in its preparation stages,
This phase was marked by the initiative of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić (hereinafter: the Initiative) and reports in the media on the reactions of political parties, civil society organisations such as the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), non-government organisations, individuals (experts, journalists, public figures, writers and analysts) to the Initiative.
Initial steps towards the institutionalisation of the internal dialogue have been made. Actually, the Government of the Republic of Serbia performed the necessary preparatory activities during September and October 2017. Working Group of the Government of the Republic of Serbia for the Support to Internal Dialogue on Kosovo and Metohija organized its first Round Table in October 2017. Representatives of faculties of law participated in the work of this Round Table. This marked the commencement of the institutional part of the internal dialogue.
Key categories in the Initiative include: a broad internal consensus that should include as wide a circle of stakeholders in the society as possible; facing reality; overcoming the Kosovo myth; permanent solution, a solution that would be sustainable in the future, a peaceful solution to the problem, realisation of „our“ key interests (i.e. the interests of Serbia and the Serbian community) and „opening the doors“ to the European Union (EU).
In reactions of political parties to the Initiative, there is a distinct classification into two groups that is immediately evident: first, political parties from the ruling majority all support the Initiative. But the positions of these parties are not mutually reconciled. For instance, some of the ruling parties believe that the path to regulating the relations of Serbia and Kosovo lies in continuing the normalisation process, and is, at the same time, the best answer to the status issue; other parties are in favour of delineation between Serbs and Albanians. This is a risk for achieving the objective of an all-encompassing consensus. The second group is comprised of political parties, movements and associations in opposition, which can be further classified into those that completely reject the Initiative and the internal dialogue and those that dispute the Initiative but still participate, or would participate, in the internal dialogue.
There are two criteria at the base of such classification: First, differences in ideology and policies. One subgroup comprises parties that are strongly ethnic-nationalistic and right-wing orientated, while the other subgroup is comprised of the followers of liberal-democratic ideology and policies. The second criterium is the (dis)agreement on the future of Serbia, i.e. (non)acceptance of Serbian membership in the EU, which also includes the relations with Russia and the West.
In terms of activities of civil society organisations and public figures in this period, the majority had an essentially positive response to the Initiative. This group actually supports the internal dialogue and the continuation of the Kosovo dialogue (Brussels dialogue), i.e. the process of normalisation of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. However, there are numerous stakeholders in the civil society that believe that the internal dialogue itself is the prelude to making the „betrayal of Kosovo“ official.
Among the politicians and parties of Serbs in Kosovo, which are in opposition, there are two distinct responses: the first welcomes the dialogue and seeks to participate in it, while the second rejects anything coming from Aleksandar Vučić, including the internal dialogue initiative. Civil society organisations and the expert public in Kosovo have joined the internal dialogue. However, the number of organisations and individuals that are involved in the internal dialogue is not at a satisfactory level.
Reactions of politicians, including the President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, indirectly indicate that there was a strong response to the Initiative among the Albanian public in Kosovo.
In the period covered by the First Report, there is a distinct absence of argument-supported discussion on the social and political circumstances in Serbia and Kosovo, on the status of relations between Serbia and Kosovo as well as on the circumstances in which the Initiative was launched. This is a consequence of the fact that those who have participated in the internal dialogue thus far have been preoccupied with matters of rule and the relations between political forces in Serbia.
Positions on the relations between Serbia and Kosovo that have been made public could be classified in the following manner: non-intervention and ignoring reality, delineation between Serbs and Albanians and Status Quo Politics.
Even though the majority is advocating for a peaceful solution to the issues in the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, there are also those stakeholders that advocate solutions with a high risk of political, or even armed, conflicts. These advocate for non-acceptance of reality and/or „frozen conflict“, i.e. status quo. What is of particular concern is the fact that the most vocal advocates of „delineation“ come from the side that is currently in power.
Despite the fact that the Initiative has linked the internal dialogue to a new phase of the Brussels dialogue, in the course of the discussion so far there have been no comprehensive, argument-supported discussions about this link. No proposals have been made that would be directly useful for the implementation of the Brussels dialogue. There are few participants of the internal dialogue who advocate the option of normalisation, which is a part of reality of Serbia and Kosovo and represents a solution that is „within reach“. Within the normalisation of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, there’s no sign of asolution to the issue of status that would be sustainable in the long-term. This shows that the resistance to Serbia joining the EU is strong and comes from numerous stakeholders. The Initiative and the commencement of the discussions on Kosovo showed that political stakeholders, as well as civil society stakeholders, are primarily divided along the line of Serbia’s „European future“. Kosovo is just an instrument to express this.
The status of Kosovo, as well as the status of the Serbian and Albanian communities within it, lie at the very heart of the Kosovo issue. In a deeper sense, this is an issue of the control over territory and administration of its resources. The discussion of this issue was marginally present in the extra-institutional part of the internal dialogue. However, it was the main topic of the first Round Table organized within the institutional part of the internal dialogue, on 31 October 2017, which included the representatives of Serbian faculties of law. However, this discussion was not of a high quality. Proposals for a realistic union of Serbia and Kosovo or some form of confederation and autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia, which were presented, were characterized by a denial of reality and by the different interests of the relevant stakeholders.
Policy of „small steps“, focusing on the improvement of the position of the Serbian community in Kosovo, primarily on the improvement of the position and protection of rights of the Serbian community, on forming the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ZSO) and on regulating the position of the SPC, were also topics of discussion within the internal dialogue so far.
Reactions are primarily based on political and ideological positions. This is more a matter of weighing the potential political and election benefits or damages, bearing in mind the upcoming elections, than an attempt to define state and national interests that would serve as the criteria for measuring achievability and effects of individual solutions.
Judging by the course of the internal dialogue thus far, as well as by the state of public discourse in Serbia and the region, the key cause of misunderstandings and (non)acceptance of reality, and therefore the Initiative as well, lies in the different political and other interests of the stakeholders. The most important line of division and conflict is not related to Kosovo, but rather to the matter of Serbia’s „European future“. It is indicative that the majority of political parties and other participants in the internal dialogue are not openly advocating the normalisation process as one of the important steps of Serbia’s accession to the EU. It is also visible that the majority are concentrating around the ethnic-nationalistic approach to the Kosovo issue. Opposition parties, including many that declare themselves as democratic or social-democratic, do not see an opportunity to build a clear strategy that would set them apart from others within the internal dialogue; there are few parties that truly position themselves as pro-European and that would be capable of resolving the issues surrounding Kosovo by accepting European acquis.
The topic of Kosovo is an excuse for ethnic and nationalistic mobilisation, due to its importance in the construction of Serbian national identity and due to its emotional and political charge. This was confirmed throughout history. In the course of the internal dialogue so far, this possibility was also expressed in advocating solutions that fail to accept reality and in advocating delineation between Serbs and Albanians. If this mobilisation was to intensify, the internal dialogue would be transformed into a propagandist-marketing manipulation. This, in turn, could lead to further and more intense extremist reactions and, consequently, could weaken the influence of institutions and the democratically orientated part of the Serbian public.
Belgrade, 25 January 2017
